The Commission decides when to draw up and review a BREF. 19 The initial 'exchange of information' on BAT takes place in a Technical Working Group (TWG), composed of 'Member States, the industries concerned, non-governmental organisations promoting environmental protection and the Commission'. 20 The legal requirements for inclusion in the TWGs are relatively even-handed between industrial and environmental interests, although other interests, such as trade unions, are notable by their absence. As discussed further below, however, economic actors are (at least quantitatively) heavily represented in the passed. 29 The registration, and information provision, obligations imposed on economic actors by REACH are central to the operation of the rest of the Regulation. The 'privatisation' of information provision, collection and assessment has been identified as one of the key 21 European IPPC Bureau, Email communication with Maria Lee, 25 July 2012. Further information has been made available during more prolonged correspondence, and is on file with the authors. 22 OKOPOL is appropriately described as an NGO, but should not be thought of (as per its own selfdescription) as an environmental advocacy organisation; it is much more concerned with its scientific credentials, and clearly works closely with public authorities and industry, www.oekopol.de/en/. 23 Art 13(3). 24 Commission Implementing Decision 2012/119/EU laying down rules concerning guidance on the collection of data and on the drawing up of BAT reference documents and on their quality assurance [2012] OJ L63/1. 25 See ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm, last accessed June 2014. 26 Art 13(4). 27 'Substance: means a chemical element and its compounds in the natural state or obtained by any manufacturing process, …', Art 3(1). 28 Art 6. 29 Art 12.
granted under the 'adequate control' provision, authorisation can be granted 'if it is shown that socio-economic benefits outweigh the risk to human health or the environment arising from the use of the substance and if there are no suitable alternative substances or technologies'. 35 Again, the applicant is likely to provide the 'first draft' of the 'socio-economic Art 62(4) . 34 Art 60(2). 'Adequate control' is another open ended standard, but means basically that particular 'safe' exposure levels are identified and not exceeded, and that the likelihood of an event such as an explosion is negligible, Art 60(2), Section 6.4 of Annex I. 35 Art 60(4).
III. The Demand for Economic Actor Enrolment
Historically, regulation has been perceived as a largely state-centred activity, and for good In similar vein, the participation of economic actors can potentially guard against the risk of 'regulatory disconnection', by which we mean the possibility that the regulatory controls, due to developments in, for example, science and technology, become disconnected from the regulatory target. 41 Private actors occupy a strategic position in which they are able to keep abreast of scientific advances and technological development. Their evolving knowledge can inform decisions about whether and when regulation needs to be adapted to reflect such changes. Both IED and REACH attempt to govern highly technically complex and potentially fast moving areas in which regulatory disconnection is a real concern.
Cost effectiveness and efficiency are other important regulatory values, closely aligned with resource asymmetry, that might be enhanced by the enrolment of private, notably economic actors. In the absence of, in particular, industry's cooperation, information generation is likely to be very costly and could render the regulatory framework inefficient. 42 The same may in some cases be said of the relative effectiveness and efficiency of different actors at other moments in the regulatory process: the diffusion of standards, monitoring and enforcement may benefit from the involvement of economic actors. 43 In addition to concerns about overall social costs, there may be a concern simply to transfer costs away from the public sector. Of course, promoting private actor involvement in, say, standard-setting will not necessarily be less resource-intensive for the regulator than traditional rule-making, bearing in mind the setup costs involved in facilitating the negotiating process. 44 But as Grabosky observes, 'a major challenge faced by democratic governments in the twenty-first century will be to achieve new efficiencies in the conduct of public affairs. One means of accomplishing this is to harness resources residing outside the public sector in furtherance of public policy.' 45 The enrolment of private actors in the regulatory process may also have the potential to strengthen the legitimacy and accountability of regulation. As Freeman notes, '[p]rivate actors are not just rent-seekers that exacerbate the traditional democracy problem in administrative law; they are also regulatory resources capable of contributing to the efficacy and legitimacy of administration'. 46 We turn to this in the next section. had to be notified by manufacturers or importers and tested; 'existing' chemicals, which in most cases had not been adequately tested when they were put on the market, were to be evaluated case by case. 48 The onus to produce evidence to justify any restrictions imposed on the use of chemicals was entirely on the regulator. Between 1996 and 1998, only four existing chemicals went through full assessment. 49 The 'no data, no market' approach in REACH is an important effort to remedy our ignorance of the qualities and impacts of chemicals. In the absence of regulation, there are disincentives on the private sector to engage in safety research.
50
Private actors may also be involved in standard-setting or rule formation, as under the IED.
In addition, private action may be crucial in fulfilling functions relating to monitoring and enforcement, including through action in the courts. These various roles may be vested in private actors by formal legal authority, but they may also have the capacity (information, wealth, organisation) to exert more informal authority that, for example, influences rule formation and enforcement processes. answer to, for example, the content of a safety data sheet under REACH. Technical assessments are pervaded by value judgments and professional assumptions, which are not necessarily self-serving, but which may consciously or unconsciously reflect the position and interests of participants. Moreover, these assumptions are often embedded in the technical assessment so that they remain unexamined and unchallenged. 54 Decisions taken under both the IED and REACH involve choices and assumptions, and these choices and assumptions contribute to the overall level of environmental protection, the risks and costs borne by neighbours, consumers and others, and the costs borne by industry (which may be passed on to employees and consumers). The political nature of the decisions being taken under REACH and the IED mean that technical expertise, or an aspiration to technical objectivity, cannot in itself render a decision-making process legitimate.
'Legitimacy' and 'accountability' are closely connected and complex terms, and are the subjects of a vast literature, to which we do not intend to add; we are very specifically 52 J. involvement of industry may increase legitimacy in the eyes of the regulated, it may simultaneously reduce legitimacy in the eyes of environmental interest groups; 71 acceptability to consumers or workers exposed to chemicals, or those living near major industrial facilities, is an additional complication. So there may be legitimacy trade-offs to be made. 65 Hutter, above n 2, at 13. For even more worrying possibilities of collusion see Freeman, above n 46 at 83. 66 Freeman, above n 46. 67 Black, above n 52. 68 Lange, above n 17, at 108. It is also possible that large organisations may seek to impose anticompetitive (possibly highly environmentally protective) standards that would disadvantage smaller businesses, or that industry already subject to high environmental standards will seek to impose those standards also on competitors. 69 Freeman, above n 44 at 23-27. 70 Black, above n 47. 71 Black, above n 39.
The complexity and dynamics of legitimacy and accountability mean that we can neither conclude in the abstract that the strong involvement of economic actors necessarily detracts from legitimacy, nor provide any simple prescription to enhance legitimacy. Legitimacy can be achieved in different ways, for example through legislative authority, regulatory expertise, accountability, and fairness, openness and participation. 72 Institutions may seek to respond to the strongest of the dynamic and complex demands being made of them, compromising other demands. 73 We can however conclude that an intimate role for economic actors in their own regulation raises questions of accountability and legitimacy that demand a response.
Inclusion, transparency and public oversight and responsibility all speak to the values of legitimacy and accountability in some way, and these are the subjects of the next section.
V. Responses
The response to the challenges of information generation cannot be simply to turn away from economic actors, back to public authority. Massive investment in public resources, such as would enable the rejection of a strong role for economic actors in governance, is politically rather unlikely. More importantly, such a response would fail to capture the complexity of regulation, or indeed of society, which is clearly apparent in the regulation scholarship. Regulatory resources are fragmented and dispersed, whether we turn to ideas of de-centred regulation 74 or the different concept of 'regulatory space', 75 or the ideas of 'reflexive law' that are apparent in Schepel's discussion of the role of the private sector in standardisation. 76 One of the challenges of responding to the involvement of economic actors in regulation is to avoid resurrecting the problems that led in the first place to a call on economic actors. More complex, and perhaps less satisfying, responses than a turn away from economic actors, need to be sought. by economic actor enrolment in regulatory implementation. Those three responses, discussed further below, are inclusion, transparency and public oversight and responsibility.
First, the inclusion of a range of public and private actors, with countervailing interests, may enhance the legitimacy of decisions, by improving the quality of a decision, and even by, as
Freeman puts it, providing an 'independent, democracy-enhancing value'. 78 Secondly, and closely related to inclusion, an emphasis on transparency should ensure the public availability of information (of various types, as discussed below). This can enhance accountability by allowing for broader scrutiny and challenge of regulatory inputs and outputs.
And thirdly, public oversight and responsibility is thought to mitigate any concern about the legitimacy of the process. Public authorities, including regulators at EU or national level, may be enabled or required to contribute to the decision-making forum, and to scrutinise the industry's input into the process. In addition, passing ultimate responsibility for a final decision back to a public body attempts to sidestep the issues around the prior involvement of economic actors, relying on the familiar political and legal legitimacy and accountability of the final decision-making body. There are a number of difficulties with this, but for now we might simply note the strain implied in any effort to rationalise innovative governance mechanisms within a highly formal EU model of delegation and agency.
Each of these responses is important. We do not suggest that even in an ideal world they will be sufficient to eliminate concern about the enrolment of economic actors in EU environmental decision-making. However, constant attention to these 'building blocks' of legitimacy should be a minimum expectation for the design of governance frameworks.
79
And studying the IED and REACH in this context illustrates three things. First, there is at least some level of legal consciousness of the importance of these safeguards. Secondly, these safeguards are potentially feasible and workable. And thirdly, as discussed in section VI below, the implementation of these safeguards could be much more consistent and effective than is currently the case.
A. Safeguard 1: Inclusion
Broad inclusion in processes of decision-making might be expected to enhance the legitimacy of the regulatory contributions of economic actors in a number of ways. It is moreover a core value that sits alongside, as well as sometimes in tension with, demands for 78 Freeman, above n 46 at 848. 79 See de Burca, above n 4 discussing, more ambitiously, the 'building blocks' of democracy.
The challenge is to ensure that so far as possible no single grouping or set of interests dominates the regulatory process. Comitology is a process that evolved to allow the Member States to supervise (in committee) the Commission's exercise of its implementing powers; it has evolved also into a forum for multi-level collaboration in decision-making. 144 We can avoid some of the complexities of comitology, and the diversity of the processes, for current purposes. collaboratively with economic actors may be preferred by EU and national actors. The
Commission and Member States may, for example, prioritise successful implementation, seek to avoid litigation, or be so wedded to success of the collaborative governance process that they follow the recommendations of bodies incorporating economic interests more than they otherwise might. 152 And it may in any event be difficult to exercise independent judgment in the face of a lengthy, complex and possibly inscrutable technical judgment. The point is that allocating ultimate responsibility to a political process does not guarantee legitimacy or accountability. This is not just a problem for the supranational context of the EU; it is a challenge for administrative decision-makers in all jurisdictions. And it serves to re-emphasise the necessary focus on legitimacy and accountability at all stages of the earlier process.
VI. Strengthening Inclusion, Transparency and Public Oversight
Our discussion so far suggests that EU law has developed some important mechanisms through which the inclusion of economic actors might tend to enhance rather than detract from the legitimacy and accountability of governance. However, our case studies reveal that the implementation of these safeguards could be much more consistent and effective than is currently the case. In this section we outline the limitations of the attempts in the IED and REACH to address some of these concerns, and suggest three (non-exhaustive) ways in which inclusion, transparency and public oversight could potentially be strengthened
Complete solutions are unavailable. The two most obvious overarching 'solutions' are probably either to include competing interests in decision-making processes on an equal basis with economic actors, or to pass final decisions to politically legitimate decision-makers.
The former is crucial, but as explored further in this section, even-handed interest representation may often be impossibly difficult; similarly, as suggested in the previous section, the latter is important, but a fragile guarantor of legitimacy. And so we make three suggestions: consistent benchmarks should be developed for the reception of outsider contributions within decision-making processes; the identity or (at least) affiliation of those participating in a decision-making process should be publicly available; regulatory, or public regarding, scrutiny of the contributions of economic actors should be strengthened. These are deceptively modest suggestions, which build directly on the safeguards already routine in EU environmental law. Their implementation would be far from straightforward, however, 152 Freeman, above n 46. conclusions, our findings would suggest that despite guaranteed opportunities that promote outsider input, economic interests are likely over-represented. The classic literature on collective action predicts that diffuse interests (such as environmental protection) find it more difficult to organise than focused interests, such as economic interests. 158 Environmental interest groups (as civil actors) do face clear weaknesses relative to industry, even once they have been included in the process. 159 Whilst the EU's diffuse and under-resourced decision-making processes may have created opportunities for environmental NGOs, 160 environmental interest groups generally have fewer resources than economic actors, and participation can be costly and time consuming. 161 Public funding may enhance the capacity of environmental NGOs, but leads to obvious concerns, for example as to independence and advocacy. Environmental groups may also have less ready access to the information most valued by decision-makers. Their possibly greater resources of legitimacy may compensate to some degree, especially if they are able to demonstrate strong connections to European 'publics' (although the possibly limited connections with grassroots was raised above). The requirement to be able to work in English, without translation services, in order to participate in TWGs is a further barrier to inclusion; the ECHA's working language is also English, and whilst there is an effort to translate, some of the information on the ECHA website is published only in English.
Perhaps there is a sense of inevitability in this discussion of the weaknesses of NGOs relative to industry. But civil actors such as environmental interest groups are not powerless, and their inclusion in IED and REACH decision-making, alongside industry, is an important expansion of the perspectives addressed in decision-making. But some self-conscious reflection on the burden that can reasonably be borne by environmental interest groups is necessary. Formal equality between environmental interest groups and economic actors must not distract from the very significant inequalities in practice, and it should not be assumed that because an environmental group was in the room, interest representation was even-handed. This leads to two of the suggestions in this section: first, that a crucial role in the identification and protection of public interests remains for regulators; and secondly, the need for clarity in every case on precisely who is participating in a decision-making forum.
One less direct response to the need to correct the selectiveness of institutional inclusion may be to provide for broader, possibly less formal, opportunities to contribute to, or at least scrutinise, regulatory processes. Such opportunities could enhance both input and output legitimacy. As discussed above, there are possibilities for outsiders to scrutinise certain documents under the IED and REACH. But recall also the absence of any clear mechanisms by which comments will be fed into the process under the IED. This contrasts with the arrangements made for contributions from members of the TWG, in which case there must be a 'commenting period of at least eight weeks', and 'detailed feedback' is required from the European IPPC Bureau 'on how their major comments have been taken into account'. 162 In short, accountability mechanisms towards insiders to the process are strong; less so externally. And under REACH, the moment at which and topics on which information is sought from outsiders are deliberately limited. Perhaps then, there is space for a more expansive role to be played by third parties who are not privileged by virtue of explicit inclusion in the regulatory decision-making process.
There are of course costs to increasing the diversity of participation in decision-making, most obviously increased transaction costs, reduced speed, the legitimacy trade offs mentioned above, even possibly associated trade offs in the reaching of other regulatory objectives. Nor are we suggesting that consensus should (or could) be the objective of participation; dissent will continue. But some very simple things are absent or unpredictable in our case studies:
wide and early availability of drafts, clear processes for feeding in comments and challenging assumptions; publication of those comments; obligations to pay account to and provide feedback on them.
The second safeguard, transparency, is important in promoting both legitimacy and accountability, and supports inclusion and participation in decision-making. Law should support the widest possible transparency when regulated parties are involved in their own regulation, including on the contents of drafts, and on choices of methodology and uncertainties, in such a way as to provide transparency to those outside (as well as inside) the process. It is also important to know which interests are participating in decision-making, and in this respect, the tensions involved in institutional approaches to protecting personal data are particularly striking. Who actually participates in decision-making needs to be both transparent and contestable (politically if not legally).The justification offered by Sharpston AG for the release of information on who contributes to decisions is compelling: 'the context (an official meeting involving representatives of an industrial group acting as spokesmen for their employers, and thus purely in a professional capacity) taken together with the principle of transparency, provided ample justification' for the release of information on participation. 163 It seems reasonable for those participating in EU governance processes, other than in particular and unusual circumstances, 164 to accept that the fact of their enrolment will be publicly available. Some might go so far as to urge openness as to precise contributions to discussions; 165 a difficult balance has to be drawn with effective deliberation, input and output legitimacy. Simply raising that question reminds us that a call for transparency is not simple, and its meaning is not self-evident.
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Law potentially has a clear role in bolstering the capacity of the first two safeguards, namely inclusion and transparency. We suggested above that the central role of economic actors in environmental governance raises concerns around the core public law values of legitimacy and accountability; it is unsurprising then that we might turn to some (deceptively) simple public law mechanisms to reinforce these values. The economic and informational advantages of economic actors are pervasive, but those with alternative interests can be at least to some extent empowered through legal rights.
As we discuss in the previous section, public oversight and responsibility can be crucial in promoting a decision-making process that is both legitimate and accountable. Of course, the IED and REACH illustrate as well as any other case that any line between 'economic actors'
and 'regulators' may not be clear, given the integration of economic actors into the regulatory process. 167 Nevertheless, there are two dimensions to this safeguard. First, public authorities play an important role in supervising and scrutinizing the contributions of economic actors.
Second, the final decision is officially taken by a public authority; in this regard, the Commission plus comitology process is the preferred way in which political administrative decisions are taken in the EU. The role of law in respect of the third safeguard is relatively limited. In particular, an acknowledgement that the legitimacy of comitology is not sufficiently robust to sidestep any concerns about the preceding process, simply points us back to the need to enhance legitimacy and accountability at all stages of decision-making, in the ways discussed generally in this paper. And the resourcing of public environmental regulators is a perennial political difficulty, one of the very factors that encourages reliance on economic actors. But it is important to guard against the long term concern raised by Grabosky that 163 Above n 131. 164 Eg whistleblowers, or those participating on potentially personally risky issues such as security; the possibility for 'ordinary' (for want of a better word) non-professional respondents to consultations to remain anonymous may also be necessary to encourage wide participation. 165 As in ClientEarth, above n 133133. 166 See, for example, Fisher, above n 115. 167 Freeman, above n 46.
envisage legal arrangements that would enhance independent, expert regulatory scrutiny of economic actors' contributions to regulation, by paying particular and explicit attention to the need for the exercise of that expertise at crucial moments in the setting up of regulatory institutions: for example, Member State representatives in TWGs could be explicitly directed to exercise independent scrutiny from a public interest regulatory perspective.
Our suggestions build on criteria already implicit in the IED and REACH, and are also consistent with developments elsewhere. It may be worth noting the ways in which periodic amendments to the Environmental Impact Assessment Directive, since its inception in 1985, have incrementally strengthened the processes applied in environmental assessment. 169 Changes have arguably improved both inclusion and transparency through adding hard detail to the demands made on Member States (for example, requiring information to be made available electronically in the latest iteration). 170 Information provided by developers, especially their 'environmental statement', is central to the process of environmental assessment that precedes the grant of development consent. Serious doubts have been raised about the quality of this information, and the European Commission has concluded that 'It seems obvious that some kind of quality control is needed in order to provide for a consistent and qualitative body of information.' 171 It may seem equally 'obvious' that we should insist that specialist (public) regulators develop expertise and expectations by consistently evaluating the quality of the information provided in environmental assessment, a possibility that has however been resisted. 172 The new Article 5(3) of the Directive, as well as requiring the developer to 'ensure that the environmental impact assessment report is prepared by competent experts', requires the competent authority to 'ensure that it has, or has access as necessary to, sufficient expertise to examine the environmental impact assessment report.' This is relatively bland, and of course may be satisfied by access to private expertise. Nevertheless, this change does indicate that the need for scrutiny is recognised, and that it is feasible for efforts to be made to respond.
Simply put, the three safeguards identified in the previous section need to be implemented with more care, and with greater sensitivity to their limitations. In particular, the fragility, in their different ways, of both environmental interest groups and comitology, indicate that there are no complete solutions to balance, or sidestep, the role of economic actors. This leads us to advocate smaller steps. There is always a danger that imposing what are essentially public law values in a de-centred decision-making context will frustrate the important benefits that economic actors bring to regulation. Perhaps trade-offs are necessary: accountability and legitimacy to broader publics for expertise, efficiency and acceptability to regulated parties. The role of law is potentially crucial, and it is the responsibility of both legislatures and the courts 173 to support the fullest possible participation and transparency. Recognition of the limited legitimacy of the Commission plus comitology option further emphasises the need to pay more attention to the nature and processes of all steps of decision-making.
VII. Conclusions
As Schepel puts it, the 'legal imperative' is 'to promote the procedural integrity' of our process, 'to diversify its membership, to enhance its knowledge base, and to broaden its ethos'. 174 We have identified three significant overlapping and non-exhaustive mechanisms by which efforts are made in EU environmental law to enhance the legitimacy and accountability of economic actor enrolment in decision-making. The first two, inclusion and transparency, are commonly urged in respect of complex forms of governance. Law can play a crucial role in ensuring greater inclusion and transparency, and importantly, must not be used to block those values. In part, the third safeguard, public oversight and responsibility, feeds into the first two: the inclusion of and scrutiny by public regarding institutions contributes important resources of legitimacy and accountability to these processes. In part it also attempts to do something else, through an effort to reassert a theoretical model of delegation and agency that is difficult to maintain in the context of high levels of technical complexity and expertise. But equally, this is an insistence that political decisions should be taken by politically legitimate bodies; and that is a value worth striving for, albeit one that simply takes us back to the need to ensure inclusion and transparency at every stage of the process.
Drawing conclusions is obviously difficult, when we have observed both the necessity for economic actor enrolment, and its inevitable challenges. Condemning economic actor involvement is obviously not an option. Instead, we must endeavour to render these sites of 173 Scott and Sturm, above n 157. 174 Schepel, above n 11 at 413.
private governance as legitimate and as accountable as possible. Grainne de Búrca's discussion of 'democratic striving' is set in the global context, where the challenges and context are different; certainly, there is no indication that scholars share a desire to 'avoid or bracket' the 'democracy problem' in the EU. 175 Nevertheless, we see some parallels between the apparent unanswerability of the challenges posed by enrolment of economic actors, and those of democratising the 'significant public-oriented policies … being established through complex transnational governance processes'. 176 'Striving' to enhance the 'building blocks' of legitimacy and accountability that are easily avoided in this context is equally important.
EU law recognises the challenges posed by economic actor enrolment, and has provided some sensible responses. The three safeguards identified here do however need to be addressed with much more rigour and consistency: broad transparency and inclusion should be considered absolutely core safeguards when economic actors are involved in governing.
Inclusion and transparency are not unintrusive or straightforward values, but equally, reliance on economic actors is far from a small matter. Further, and learning some of the lessons of the financial crisis, it is important that the enrolment of economic actors is not perceived to be a cheap or easy option for public regulators; the continued demand for resources of expertise and time in the public sector is significant. 177 Similarly, we should note that public-led command and control initiatives are still core to the regulatory landscape.
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The two cases discussed here indeed indicate that command and control and the enrolment of economic actors are by no means incompatible; command and control relies in part on the resources of economic actors. The challenges of legitimacy and accountability, and their reflection in law, are not easily avoided.
